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ABSTRACT
In this article we criticize the so-called more economic approach to
European competition law for disregarding the importance of a functional
system of private law. Based on the availability of market governance as an
alternative mode for organizing transactions, it is presumed that vertical
integration, which is the central organizational structure of transnational
corporations, is economically efficient. Since the enforcement of cross-border
contracts by state-organized systems of private law, however, is insufficient,
"make-or-buy" decisions in international commerce are prejudiced against
arms' length transactions in markets. Consequently, international
transactions are integrated vertically into firms' structures to a higher
degree than comparable domestic transactions organized in the shadow of
domestic private law. The resulting overintegration of world markets leads
to reduced competitive incentives and high bureaucratic costs. Contrary to
the fundamental assumptions of the more economic approach, vertical
integration does not, therefore, foster consumer welfare in the global
economy per se. However, as this overintegration is a reasonable reaction to
the deficits in state protection of cross-border contracts, a strict world
antitrust law cannot counter it without suppressing cross-border exchange.
Thus, international private law policy establishing legal certainty in the
enforcement of cross-border contracts currently seems to be the instrument
of choice in promoting competition in the global economy.
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I. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS A CHALLENGE TO COMPETITION
POLICY
The fundamental nexus of private law and competition policy is
mundane: economic competition requires a functional market, which in
turn requires effective institutions for the enforcement of contracts.' The
economic constitution in an ordoliberal sense, therefore, consists not only
of a regulatory part, which aims at protecting competition against state
restrictions (fundamental freedoms) and private limitations (antitrust law)
alike, but it also entails a facilitative part, which aims at protecting
individuals against the opportunistic behavior of their transaction
partners (through private rights and remedies).2 According to institutional
economist and Nobel laureate Douglass C. North, the latter is so essential
that the economic problems of many developing and transition countries
can be explained by respective deficiencies in their domestic legal
systems.3 However, institutions for the enforcement of contracts are not
only provided by the state but also via private self-organization. 4 The rise
of European trade at the end of the Middle Ages was, for instance, based
on institutions created by merchants themselves.5 It was not until the
nineteenth century that commercial law became nationalized in Europe;
thereby nation-states established the institutional foundation for their
economic rise.6 Since then, the existence of an effective system of private
rights and remedies organized by the state has been seen as a matter of
course, which is why the market-constitutive function of private law
1. Detailed in Gillian K. Hadfield, The Many Legal Institutions that Support
Contractual Commitments, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 175 (Claude
M6nard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2008).
2. See Wolfgang Kerber & Viktor Vanberg, Constitutional Aspects of Party Autonomy
and Its Limits - The Perspective of Constitutional Economics, in PARTY AUTONOMY AND THE
ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET 49 (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2001)
(citing JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN
(1975)); Franz Bhm, Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft, 17 JAHRBUCH FOR DIE
ORDNUNG VONWIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFr [ORDO] 75 (1966).
3. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 59-60 (1990); cf. THRAINN EGGERTSSON, IMPERFECT INSTITUTIONS:
POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF REFORM 82 (2005).
4. For more detail, see AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE
MODES OF GOVERNANCE 97-110 (2004).
5. See generally AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY:
LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 55-152 (2006).
6. Gralf-Peter Calliess, The Making of Transnational Contract Law, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 469, 473-74 (2007).
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hardly finds any attention in the current debate about competition policy
and antitrust legislation on a global level.7
However, the neglect of the private law foundations of competition
becomes problematic when established institutions meant to enforce
contracts become less and less effective.8 Yet, this is precisely what is
currently happening, insofar as law seems to be unable to keep pace with
the globalization of the economy. National private law provides legal
certainty, namely for the domestic market, while cross-border exchange is
filled with numerous uncertainties regarding the enforcement of
contracts.9 Those uncertainties result in additional transaction costs,
which have a trade-restricting effect equivalent to customs duties.' 0
Empirical studies confirm that the parties to cross-border transactions
only rely on state-organized private law to a marginal extent; instead,
global trade relies on numerous forms of private governance, from
relational contracts and reputational networks to means of arbitration."
From the vista of competition policy, vertical integration is of
particular significance in overcoming the constitutional uncertainty 2
7. See, e.g., OLiVER BUDZINSIGI, THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION (2008)
(suggesting that intermediate position on how governance of global competition should occur,
between the extremes of completely decentralized firm-imposed governance and completely
centralized global laws); MAHER M. DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST
POLIcY (2003) (describing the nature of the "internationalization process," and analyzing
whether it is a matter of law or politics and making suggestions about the development of
the process); Hans-Jirgen Ruppelt, Competition Policy in an Interdependent World Economy,
in COMPETITION PouCY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY (Erhard Kantzenbach et
al. eds., 1993).
8. DIXIT, supra note 4, at 3 (Thus conventional economic theory does not underestimate
the importance of law; rather, the problem is that it takes the existence of a well-functioning
institution of state law for granted."). This applies similarly for the legal debate.
9. See CHRISTIAN BUHRING-UHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 12-27 (2d ed. 2006).
10. See James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, Trade Costs, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE
691, 721-23 (2004) (containing a literature survey with further references).
11. Gralf-Peter Calliess et al., Transformations of Commercial Law: New Forms of Legal
Certainty for Globalized Exchange Processes?, in TRANSFORMING THE GOLDEN-AGE NATION
STATE (Achim Hurrelmann et al. eds., 2007); Thomas Dietz & Holger Nieswandt, The
Emergence of Transnational Cooperation in the Software Industry, in CONTRACTUAL
CERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND THEORETICAL DEBATES ON
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGES 87 (Volkmar Gessner ed., 2009)
[collection hereinafter CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY]; Wioletta Konradi, The Role of Lex
Mercatoria in Supporting Globalised Transactions- An Empirical Insight into the Governance
Structure of the Timber Industry, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY, supra, at 49; Fabian P. Sosa,
Cross-Border Dispute Resolution from the Perspective of Mid-Sized Law Firms: The Example
of International Commercial Arbitration, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY, supra, at 107.
12. Cf. Dieter Schmidtchen & Hans Jorg Schmidt-Trenz, New Institutional Economics of
International Transactions: Constitutional Uncertainty and the Creation of Institutions in
Foreign Trade as Exemplified by the Multinational Firm, 9 JAHRBUCH FOR NEUE POLITISCHE
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inherent in cross-border transactions. Instead of importing preproducts via
foreign suppliers from the world market and selling them as assembled
products to foreign merchants, an internationally active corporation can
alternatively create these processes through foreign subsidiaries.
Transaction cost economics inquires into the conditions of these so-called
make-or-buy decisions. In the given context, it is decisive that vertical
integration excludes cross-border transactions from the market. Therefore,
a functional system of private law is not required in terms of contract
enforcement, as there are no independent parties involved in the
transaction. In the case of intrafirm trade, cooperation problems can be
solved within the corporate hierarchy by means of fiat.' 3
Transnational corporations and their network of suppliers and
distributors hold great significance for world trade. 14 The classic
transnational corporation consists of a parent company that controls
foreign subsidiaries through equity shares safeguarded by national
property law and company law.15 The parent company therefore provides
foreign direct investments: it acquires a controlling interest in foreign sites
and facilities or establishes subsidiaries, thereby safeguarding a
substantial influence on company policy.' 6 The importance of
transnational corporations becomes obvious when looking at the recent
growth of global foreign direct investments; they rose from about $200
billion in 1989 to a record high of $1,833 billion in 2007, of which cross-
border mergers accounted for a significant part.17
There is no reliable data available on transnational corporations'
share of global exports. Yet, since the mid-1980s, foreign direct
investments have grown more rapidly than world exports and the world
economy as such.' 8 According to estimates by the United Nations
OKONOMIE 3, 18-19 (1990) (explaining that constitutional uncertainty results from the
"possessive security" of protective states and the "absence of transactional security" in
foreign trade).
13. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 7 (2005);
see also GioRio BARBA NAVARETI & ANTHONY J. VENABLES, MULTINATIONAL FIRMS IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY 99-126 (2004) (concerning multinational corporations in particular).
14. See JOHN H. DUNNING & SARIANNA M. LUNDAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 463-502 (2d ed. 2008).
15. See PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 56 (2d ed.
2007).
16. Bruce A. Blonigen, Foreign Direct Investment, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
EcONOMIcS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008), available at
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id-pde2008_F000168.
17. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 2008:
Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge, at 3, U.N. Sales No.
E.08.II.D.23 (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008 en.pdf.
18. See DUNNING & LUNDAN, supra note 14, at 17-20 (discussing also the limited
reliability of the data); cf. Pol AntrAs, Firms, Contracts, And Trade Structure, 118 Q.J. EcoN.
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Conference on Trade and Development, intrafirm trade within
transnational corporations accounts for one-third of world exports, and
this share is even larger if one includes the nonequity relationships of
transnational corporations with companies in their supply or distribution
chain, which the former de facto control due to existing economic
dependency (e.g., international subcontracting, licensing, contract
manufacturers). 19
This fact-that is, the central thesis of this article-questions a
number of fundamental assumptions of current competition policy. In the
following, we illustrate this point with regard to the assessment of vertical
integration in antitrust regulation. Anticompetitive agreements, as well as
mergers in the vertical dimension (i.e., between enterprises operating at
different levels of the supply chain), are subject to regulation by European
competition law. From the view of transaction cost economics, however,
vertical integration leads to increased efficiency, the advantages of which
are ultimately passed on to consumers. This is why antitrust authorities
are suggested to scrutinize vertical agreements and vertical mergers in a
rather lax manner.20 This economic view of antitrust law has recently also
found its way into European competition policy as the so-called more
economic approach.2 1
The fact that transaction cost theory provides no verifiable criteria
that would allow antitrust authorities to distinguish between efficient and
inefficient forms of vertical integration is especially problematic. In this
regard, one relies on the mere assumption of efficiency, as from an
evolutionary perspective, an inefficient level of vertical integration would
not survive at the market. Accordingly, oversized firms cannot keep up
with smaller competitors due to overwhelming bureaucratic costs. The
former either react by outsourcing noncore competences to third parties or
they vanish from the market.22 However, this exact assumption loses its
1375 (2003) (describing and analyzing systematic patterns in the development of world
intrafirm trade volume, using data from U.S. firms).
19. UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2002: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS, at 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2002 (2002), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2002overviewen.pdf.
20. For more information, see the seminal work by OLIVER E. WILLAMSON, MARKETS
AND HIERARCHIES, ANALYSIS AND ANTITRusT IMPLICATIONS (1975), in which he combines
economics and organization theory.
21. See, e.g., THE MORE EcONOMIC APPROACH TO EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAw (Dieter
Schmidtchen et al. eds., 2007).
22. Williamson, supra note 13, at 12 (MTIry markets, try hybrids, and have recourse to
the firm only when all else fails."). For the theoretical problems of taking efficiency criteria
into account as normative goals of competition policy, see Wolfgang Kerber, Should
Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections of an Economist on the Normative
Foundations of Competition Law, in EcoNOMIc THEORY AND COMPETITION LAW (Josef Drexi
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foundation once the state does not provide the institutional preconditions
for market exchange, as is the case at the global level. In the face of the
above-outlined legal uncertainty in the enforcement of cross-border
contracts, transactions that domestically could easily take place in the
market are instead converted into the organizational forms of hybrids or
hierarchy on the international level.23 The following theses therefore
deserve closer inspection:
1. Concerning the enforcement of cross-border contracts, the protection
afforded by state-organized systems of private law is inadequate. As a
result, international transactions are integrated vertically to a higher
degree than is economically sensible for comparable domestic transactions.
2. This overintegration of world markets leads to reduced competitive
incentives and high bureaucratic costs. Contrary to the fundamental
assumptions of the "more economic approach," vertical integration does
not foster consumer welfare per se. Rather, it can prove to be an
economically inefficient reaction to the deficit in state protection of cross-
border contracts.
3. However, the excess of cross-border vertical integration cannot be
countered by a strict world antitrust law, but only by establishing legal
certainty in the enforcement of cross-border contracts. In this sense,
private law policy is currently the best global competition policy.
In order to elaborate these theses further, in part II, we first introduce
the model of the firm as the functional equivalent of the market, and in
part III, we apply the model to the different legal organizational forms of
transnational corporations. With the help of this theoretical concept, we
will then demonstrate why the general support of vertical integration by
proponents of the more economic approach (see part IV) is out of place
when it comes to cross-border transactions (see part V). In part VI, our
conclusion, we postulate to pursue competition policy through the
provision of effective legal protection of cross-border transactions by means
of private law.
et al. eds., 2009), available at http://www.uni-marburg.de/fbO2/makro/forschung/gelbereihe/
artikel/2007-09_kerber.pdf.
23. Rebecca Hellerstein & Sofia B. Villas-Boas, Outsourcing and Pass-Through 24 (Univ.
of Cal, Berkeley, Dep't of Agric. & Res. Econ. & Policy, CUDARE Working Paper No.
1016R3, Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1112&context=areucb.
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II. CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS: TO MAKE OR BUY INTERNATIONALLY
The business decision to organize cross-border transactions in the form
of intrafirm trade within a transnational corporation is so complex that
the respective literature offers numerous explanatory approaches. 24
Hymer originally rooted the comparative advantage of transnational
corporations vis-A-vis domestic competitors in their extended monopolistic
positions.25 Modern business organization literature focuses on the specific
knowledge-based advantages of corporate structures.26 The outline below
follows Dunning's "eclectic paradigm," which systematically combines
different advantages of a corporation in a broad theoretical framework. 27
A. Ownership-and Location-Advantages of the Firm
The pooling of processes within a firm leading to cost and competitive
advantages is very important. For instance, investments in a strong brand
name or in the development of plans and patents are capital intensive, but
they can be transferred to subsidiaries without much additional costs.
Similarly, the joint conduct of corporate management and administration
can lead to economies of scale. Economies of scope can, for instance,
emerge through a bundled purchasing policy, when it comes to the
production of complementary products. Furthermore, transnational
corporations also provide advantages of location through the flexible
intrafirm relocation of production to different nation-states. This strategy
allows these corporations to capitalize on advantages in labor costs and
taxes and reduce the risk of currency fluctuations.
24. For an overview, see Jean-Frangois Hennart, Theories of the Multinational
Enterprise, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (Alan M. Rugman ed.,
2009).
25. See STEPHEN H. HYMER, THE INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF NATIONAL FIRMS (2d
ed. 1976).
26. See Anil K Gupta & Vijay Govindarajan, Knowledge Flows Within Multinational
Corporations, 21 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 473, 473-74 (2000); Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander,
Knowledge of the Firm and the Evolutionary Theory of the Multinational Corporation, 24
J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 625, 625-27 (1993).
27. DUNNING & LUNDAN, supra note 14, at 95 (using the terms "ownership-," "location-,"
and "internalization-advantages'). Another overview can be found in James R. Markusen,
The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory of International 7)ade, 9 J.
EcoN. PERSP. 169 (1995).
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B. Internalization Advantages: The Firm as Functional Equivalent of the
Market
However, on their own, these outlined advantages often do not
sufficiently explain why the expansion of one's organizational structure
into foreign countries is ultimately beneficial. Many of these advantages
could be realized by just licensing an independent company, thereby
avoiding the high costs of establishing a foreign subsidiary. For instance,
low wage costs do not provide a convincing reason for integrating a
production process into a corporation, as a company can similarly benefit
from them both by purchasing (pre-)products from an independent
supplier according to local wage costs and prices, or by licensing a foreign
enterprise to produce and sell end products locally. High costs for research
and development could similarly be financed by licensing agreements with
other enterprises.
Therefore, there must be another specific advantage offered by
transnational corporations that importing or licensing cannot provide. 28
One other important feature of the corporate structure is that it generates
the institutional preconditions for the conduct of cross-border transactions
internally. By organizing transactions within the corporate structure as a
functional equivalent of the free market, problems with external
transaction partners can be avoided. 29 Conflict resolution mechanisms are
made available by structures of dependency and hierarchy. Due to its
connection to the central thesis of this article, the advantage of
internalization is further detailed in the following sections and provides
the backdrop for the subsequent argument. This is not to say that
internalization is a sufficient or unique explanatory approach to cross-
border vertical integration. Rather, we recognize that internalization
theory hints at one reason among others for the existence of firms.
However, we argue that-all other circumstances being equal-the lack of
facilitative private law for cross-border transactions does provide an
explanation for the level of vertical integration of transactions, which is
often underestimated.
1. The Essential Features of Transaction Cost Theory
The notion that the formation of companies is a reaction to the high
costs of the market mechanism is a decisive one. Established in 1937 by
28. Markusen, supra note 27, at 181.
29. ALAN M. RUGMAN, INSIDE THE MULTINATIONAs: THE EcONOMICS OF INTERNAL
MARKETS 4 (1981).
850
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Coase, and further refined by Williamson,30 this approach starts with the
assumption that every transaction necessarily produces frictional losses,
not caused by the costs of production, materials, personnel, or transport,
but by interpersonal communication and interaction at economic
interfaces: the so-called transaction costs. 31 The level of transaction costs
is influenced by three factors: specificity, uncertainty, and the frequency of
transactions. 32
Specificity denotes the extent of certain expenditures for a particular
transaction-such as investments in material, personnel, or
development-that cannot be transferred to a different transaction context
(sunk costs). For instance, if an automotive supplier opens an assembly
line that can only produce parts for a particular vehicle manufacturer, this
is a highly specific transaction, as the investment of the supplier can only
pay off through a successful exchange with this particular manufacturer.
Conversely, unspecific assets would be, for example, the one-time purchase
of some raw material, as the parties could also use their right of disposal
in other transaction contexts without loss.
Uncertainty refers to the behavior of parties that are assumed to act
opportunistically. The common advantage stemming from the conduct of
transactions according to agreement becomes threatened when a party
aspires to achieve an even higher individual profit through noncooperative
behavior. 33 The parties try to maximize their benefit ex ante through the
design of agreements, making costly negotiations necessary. Ex post, the
breach of contract looms, thereby causing costs from litigation and the
enforcement of law.
Frequency refers to the repetition of individual but uniform
transactions between parties. Hence, it is not economically sensible to
change one's power supplier daily, because the cost of the change
outweighs the. potentially achievable gains from lower electricity rates.
Uniform exchange occurs frequently, thus becoming embedded in a long-
term business relationship or even integrated into a corporate structure.
2. A Question of Organization: Make or Buy?
Transaction cost theory analyzes individual transactions at the
microlevel. It is crucial that a transaction signifies the transfer of a good or
30. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA, NEW SERIES 386 (1937);
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
31. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 18-23 (1985)
("Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems.").
32. Id. at 52-61.
33. Id. at 34.
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service via a technologically separable interface-which does not
necessarily comprise a crossing of legal boundaries between separate legal
entities. As the conduct of transactions can be arranged in a variety of
different institutional arrangements, it is a central matter as to which
institutional design produces the lowest transaction costs. Three different
modes of governance are available.
First, market governance signifies one extreme in the continuum of
organizational forms; it allows independent parties to meet without having
to establish or maintain relations beyond an individual business
transaction (arm's length trade).34 From a legal perspective, it represents
the conclusion of individual contracts of sale or for services between
independent legal subjects, encompassing all aspects of the transaction
once and for all. While the interplay of independent parties at the market
produces low bureaucratic costs and a high level of competition for simple
transactions, these instruments are far more problematic when it comes to
complex transactions. As all future developments have to be
comprehensively taken into account, transaction costs increase
dramatically through complex contract negotiations and a lack of
flexibility. Additionally, specific investments increase the dependency on
the goodwill of the business partner, who can take advantage of the
situation by breaching the contract or by using blackmailing techniques in
renegotiations.
Second, in order to counter this so-called hold-up problematique,
different bilateral and trilateral governance mechanisms are available in
the hybrid governance mode.35 Their fundamental feature is to provide
positive incentives for the performance of a contract through the prospect
of continued transactions and good reputation in long-term, personal,
dependent relations.36 Bilateral relational contracts3 7 do not have to
determine all details in advance; rather, they can remain flexible due to
long-term interdependencies. Trilateral forms of organizations are, for
34. Id. at 73; Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 856-59
(1977).
35. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 31, at 249.
36. See Hans-J6rg Schmidt-Trenz & Dieter Schmidtchen, Private International Trade in
the Shadow of the Territoriality of Law: Why Does It Work?, 58 S. ECON. J. 329, 332-36 (1991)
(describing the incentives for repeated transactions).
37. See MacNeil, supra note 34, at 889-94; Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract: What We
Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483 (describing the relational nature of contracts);
Stewart MacAulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55 (1963) (presenting a study describing how businessmen often leave out defining
a contractual relationship completely and often avoid resort to legal sanction).
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instance, reputation-based trading networks or the involvement of
arbitrators, intermediaries, and banks respectively. 38
Third, in order to avoid the uncertainty of market transactions
entirely, transactions can also take place within a unitary corporate
structure (i.e., within the firm as an organizational antipode to the market
(the uniform governance mode)). In this case, the business units do not
conclude contracts of sale or service among each other, as de jure, they are
part of the same legal entity that cannot enter into a contract with itself.
Rather, the corporate management controls transactions hierarchically.
The different organizational forms can be pictured schematically as
follows:
Figure 1: The Make-or-Buy Decision and the Organizational Variants of
TransactionS39
f
38. See Gralf-Peter Calliess, Transnational Civil Regimes: Economic Globalization and
the Evolution of Commercial Law, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY, supra note 11, at 215.
39. Source: The authors' own design, following Arnold Picot, Ein neuer Ansatz zur
Gestaltung von Leistungstiefe, SCHMALENBACHs ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE FORSCHUNG 1991, at 336, 340.
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III. THE CONTROL OF TRANSACTIONS IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
At this point, it is significant how these organizational models in
theoretical accounts are reflected in different types of transnational
corporations.
If a parent company owns all the shares of a foreign subsidiary,
from an economic viewpoint, the corporate structure equals the model of
a hierarchical firm in transaction cost theory. Even if subsidiaries are
mostly constituted as independent legal entities according to the rules
and regulations of their respective home countries, internal firm
conflicts can be resolved either by the corporate structure, the
shareholder authority under company law, or internal mediation
mechanisms. Usually authority is exercised by (threat of) intervention
into personnel policy, whereby factually binding instructions are given
to the management of the subsidiary. Thus, the firm becomes its own
"court of ultimate appeal."40
As hierarchical structures become relatively inflexible with the
growing size of a corporation, increasingly flatter "heterarchical"
structures are implemented, linking individual units of a corporation in
a network-like fashion, without making integration into the parent
company by means of shareholder control a mandatory step.41 Thus,
without the means of majority shareholder influence, classic
hierarchical structures are often unavailable for the resolution of
conflicts.42 If the share ratio does not allow direct instructions, influence
can often only be exerted indirectly via participation in individual
questions or personnel decisions through minority voting rights. If no
equity involvement exists at all, the distinction from hybrid forms of
organization becomes blurred. The loose links in such network
corporations, which are no longer corporate entities in the classical
sense, are based on relational contracts. In order to achieve stable
expectations for network-internal transactions, these contracts draw on
40. Williamson, supra note 13, at 9-10.
41. MUCHI-NSI, supra note 15 at 57-61; see also UNCTAD, supra note 17, at 249
("Foreign direct investors may also obtain an effective voice in the management of another
business entity through means other than acquiring an equity stake. These are also non-
equity forms of investment, which include, among other things, subcontracting, management
contracts, turnkey arrangements, franchising, licensing and product-sharing").
42. According to German law, for instance, contracts of domination under Section 293 I
AktG require the consent of at least 75% of votes present at a decision. Aktiengesetz [AktG]
[Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBIATr [BGBl. I] at 1089, last amended
by Gesetz [G], Dec. 9, 2010, BGBl. I at 1900, § 293 (Ger.).
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the incentive for repeated exchange and reputational mechanisms. 43
Based on continued business transactions, joint ventures are ultimately
long-term framework contracts, in which two or more companies work
together without one party controlling another hierarchically. MacNeil
even argues that "the corporation itself is one of the greatest relational
contracts ever."44
The classic criteria according to which a parent company has to be
able to control its subsidiaries by virtue of equity shares does not do
complete justice to modern forms of corporations. New approaches in
defining transnational corporations are therefore often very general,
such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's
"Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises":
[Multinational enterprises] usually comprise companies
or other entities established in more than one country
and so linked that they may co-ordinate their operations
in various ways. While one or more of these entities may
be able to exercise a significant influence over the
activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the
enterprise may vary widely from one multinational
enterprise to another.45
Accordingly, the essential feature here is the ability of one or several
corporate units to control the others, regardless of whether their links
are arranged by means of equity shares or contract only. The vagueness
of this definition causes numerous problems, such as the issue of
responsibility and liability of corporate units for the misconduct of
business units linked only by so-called control contracts.46 For the
purpose of this article, however, such a broad definition illustrates that
transnational corporations are not congruent with the Williamsonian
firm as a unilateral hierarchical apparatus. Rather, they have a broad
range of instruments at their disposal to generate sufficiently stable
expectations for transactions through self-organized institutions.
Besides classic hierarchy, increasingly, hybrid governance
mechanisms-in the form of dependency relations established by
43. See Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,
12 REs. ORG. BEHAV. 295, 303-05 (1990); Schmidtchen & Schmidt-Trenz, supra note 12, at
22-26.
44. MacNeil, supra note 37, at 492.
45. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEv. [OECD], OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 12 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
56/36/1922428.pdf.
46. See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 15, at 78.
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relational contracts-are used to safeguard transactions within the
corporate structure.
IV. AN EVALUATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS REGARDING
COMPETITION POLICY
As noted above, transnational corporations are important for the
organization of cross-border trade. However, their economic power
raises concerns as to competition policy. In the following section, we
address in what way transnational corporations affect cross-border
trade and how this is perceived in competition policy.
A. Transnational Corporations as a Form of Vertical Integration
To what extent is the insight that transnational corporations, as a
functional equivalent of market governance, integrate transactions into
structures of hierarchy and dependency significant for their assessment
in competition policy? This functional conception allows one to draw
conclusions about those economic relations typically affected. Two
corporations operating at the same level of the supply chain normally do
not exchange goods and services, as they are not complementary.
Horizontal integration can occur if the whole production process is
taken over by foreign subsidiaries, or if research and development
cooperations exist. However, the make-or-buy decision is especially
required when it comes to transactions between market participants
operating at different levels of the supply chain, for instance, when raw
materials or supplier parts are acquired or when end products are sold.
Thus, as far as control is achieved by means of equity involvement,
vertical mergers are primarily relevant for competition policy. At the
European level, these mergers are regulated by the European
Competition (EC) merger regulation. However, in modern heterarchical
concepts of corporations that are governed by relational contracts,
vertical agreements regulated by Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (formerly Article 81(3) of
the Treaty on the European Union) are significant47 In the following,
the term "vertical integration" is used as a broad concept covering all
facets of the integration of transactions into corporate structures or
structures of dependency.
47. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
101(1), Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 88 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eulbexUriServfLexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF.
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Before the next section details substantial aspects in the assessment
of vertical integration in cross-border markets, it is first helpful to recall
the numerous controversies in the history of the treatment of vertical
integration in the most important economic jurisdictions-the United
States and European Union.48
B. The U.S. School: From Harvard to Chicago
After an initial orientation phase and the introduction of national
competition law through the Sherman Act of 1890, the dominant
opinion at the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States
was that vertical integration would typically hamper competition by
allowing companies to gain market power and harm competitors. Grown
out of the economic thinking of the Harvard school, this utterly
restrictive basic attitude toward all forms of vertical mergers and
agreements shaped U.S. competition theory and practice into the 1970s.
Due to fundamental criticism of lawyers and economists close to the
Chicago school, 49 since the beginning of the 1980s an extremely liberal
attitude toward vertical mergers and agreements dominated practice so
that such measures remained almost entirely without objections from
then on.50
Chicago reproached the Harvard school for developing a phobia
about market power, which had no basis in economic theory and
prevented a potential increase of efficiency gained through sensible
forms of vertical integration. However, the Chicago school itself applied
a strictly rational model based on neoclassical pricing theory, arguing
that vertical integration could not be a consequence of the desire for
market-dominant positions. First, as the ideal monopoly rent can be
achieved by dominating only one economic stage, there is no incentive
for the expansion of a market-dominant position from one economic
stage to another. Second, it would be no advantage to invest resources
in superseding competitors, as principally, no restrictions to market
48. See generally JEFFREY CHURCH, THE IMPACT OF VERTICAL AND CONGLOMERATE
MERGERS ON COMPETITION (2004), available at http://ec.europa.eulcompetitionl/mergers/
studies reports/mergerjimpact.pdf (providing more details on antitrust concerns in relation
to vertical mergers, in a final report to the European Commission); Michael H. Riordan &
Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J.
513 (1995) (describing the lack of consensus about when anticompetitive effects can occur in
the area of vertical price agreements).
49. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978); Richard Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979) (describing the seminal criticisms of lawyers and economists belonging to the Chicago
school of thought).
50. MASSINO MOITA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 8-9 (2004).
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access exist and hence, new competitors would enter the market. This
assumption allowed the argument that vertical integration was not
motivated by a desire for market power but was instead concerned with
efficiency advantages,51 which from the perspective of transaction cost
theory could be achieved by moving exchange processes from the
unassisted market into corporate organizations. 52 In terms of antitrust,
vertical integration was harmless, or even desirable,53 as it served
consumer welfare as the sole aim of competition policy. 54
C. The Current Assessment in European Competition Law
Even if the theoretical foundations of competition policy today are
significantly more complex than at the time of the advent of the Chicago
school, efficiency criteria are still fundamentally influential and have
gained significance in practice and the literature on this side of the
Atlantic as well.5 5 This development is manifest in the competition law
of the European Union, which has gradually become economized in the
course of the so-called more economic approach.56 The relevant
51. Posner, supra note 49, at 927. For a similar outline, see MUCHLINSKI, supra note 15,
at 41.
52. OUVER E. WILLIAMSON, Transaction Cost Economics, in HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 41, 58 (Claude M~nard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005).
53. See Posner, supra note 49, at 929; BORK, supra note 49, at 226 ("Antitrust's concern
with vertical mergers is mistaken. Vertical mergers are means of creating efficiency, not of
injuring competition.... The vertical mergers the law currently outlaws have no effect other
than the creation of efficiency."); id. at 297 ("We have seen that vertical price fixing (resale
price maintenance), vertical market division (closed dealer territories), and, indeed, all
vertical restraints are beneficial to consumers and should for that reason be completely
lawful.").
54. For the aims of the Chicago school, see BORK, supra note 49, at 81.
55. Margaret Bloom, The Great Reformer: Mario Monti's Legacy in Article 81 and
Cartel Policy, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2005, at 55, 55. Compare the following
quote from a speech by Mario Monti, former European Commissioner for Competition
Policy: "It is fair to say that the far-reaching policy shift which occurred in US antitrust
enforcement during the 1980s - namely, the shift towards a focus on the economic welfare
of consumers - has been mirrored in the policy priorities of the European Commission
during the 1990's. During my term as Competition Commissioner, I have taken several
steps aimed at further reinforcing this trend . . . ." Mario Monti, Eur. Comm'r for
Competition Policy, Eur. Comm'n, Address at the UCLA Law First Annual Institute on
US and EU Antitrust Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions: Convergence in EU-US
Antitrust Policy Regarding Mergers and Acquisitions: An EU Perspective (Feb. 28, 2004).
56. For more detail, see THE MORE ECONOMIc APPROACH TO EUROPEAN COMPETITION
LAW, supra note 21; Damien Geradin, Efficiency Claims in EC Competition Law and Sector-
Specific Regulation, in THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: WHOSE
REGULATION, WHICH COMPETITION? 313 (Hanns Ullrich ed., 2006); Lars-Hendrik Riller,
Economic Analysis and Competition Policy Enforcement in Europe, in MODELLING
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literature, therefore, stresses the advantages of vertical integration,
which can lead to lower transaction costs through a better coordination
of production, the protection of specific investments against
opportunistic behavior, the protection of internal firm know-how, and
effective measures against free-riding.5 7 According to the position of the
European Commission, as long as sufficient competition exists between
the suppliers of comparable products, the restriction of vertical
competition is harmless, and even beneficial to competition and
efficiency. Concerns exist only in principle if one party acquires market
power through a measure or if an existing strong market position is
further expanded.58 The gist of the argument refers here mainly to
Article 101(3) of the TFEU, which exempts vertical agreements from the
ban in Article 101(1) of the TFEU under the premise that consumers
have their appropriate share in increased efficiency.59 The decree of the
block exemption regulations for vertical agreements is evidence of the
fundamental assumption that microeconomically efficient forms of
vertical integration have such a positive effect that gains in efficiency
reach the macroeconomic level through the so-called consumer pass-on.
The notion of efficiency becomes manifest in statutory provisions.
Take, for example, recital (6) of the so-called Umbrella Block Exemption
of 1999 (vertical block exemption60 ), in which the potential decrease of
transaction costs through vertical agreements is expressly mentioned.
The key role of the efficiency criterion can furthermore be seen in
recitals (7) to (9)61 as well as in further group exemption regulations
geared toward specific economic areas. 62 The same can be said about the
revised version of the European merger regulation,63 whose recital (29)
states that the assessment of mergers should take account of justified
and likely efficiency advantages. In Article 2(1)(b) of the European
Community Merger Regulation, the efficiency criterion can be found
EUROPEAN MERGERS: THEORY, COMPETITION POLICY AND CASE STUDIES 13 (Peter A.G. van
Bergeijk & Erik Kloosterhuis eds., 2005).
57. E.g., RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 616 (6th ed. 2008).
58. See CHURCH, supra note 48, at 4.
59. TFEU art. 101(3), Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 89.
60. Commission Regulation 2790/1999, On the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty
to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, recital (6), 1999 O.J. (L 336)
21, 21.
61. Id. at 21 (recitals (7)-(9)).
62. E.g., Commission Regulation 772/2004, On the Application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11, 11-12;
Commission Regulation 1400/2002, On the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to
Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Motor Vehicle Sector,
2002 O.J. (L 203) 30, 30.
63. Council Regulation 139/2004, On the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings (The EC Merger Regulation), recital (29), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 4 (EC).
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again with reference to the development of technological and economic
progress. Lastly, the EU Commission has confirmed and concretized
this position in its "Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal
Mergers" 64 by expressly stating that vertical mergers are both basically
harmless with regard to competition and generate efficiency gains.65
Although it is now acknowledged that vertical agreements and
mergers pose issues for competition policy under certain circumstances,
the opinion remains dominant that they increase consumers' welfare
and should therefore, on principle, not be opposed.66
V. THE BLIND SPOT: CROss-BORDER VERTICAL INTEGRATION
The argument for the efficiency advantages of vertical integration
rests in the reasoning of transaction cost theory-namely, that
dependency structures and corporate structures can compensate for
high transaction costs in the market and that this is ultimately positive
for consumers and hence, for the economy. It is, however, questionable
whether this conclusion can also be drawn for international matters.
A. The Particularity of Cross-Border Transactions
The transfer of this reasoning on international matters could
conflict with a lack of differentiation in the conception of transaction
cost theory. Transaction cost theory rests on the implicit assumption
that transactions take place against the backdrop of a functioning
private law regime organized by the state (i.e., "in the shadow of law"67).
But what happens once one leaves the safe terrain of the nation-state?
64. Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under the Council
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. (C 265) 6,
available at http://ec.europa.eulcomm/competition/mergers/legislation/nonhorizontal
guidelines.pdf.
65. The following passages of the guideline support our argument: paragraph 11: "Non-
horizontal mergers are generally less likely to significantly impede effective competition
than horizontal mergers."; paragraph 12: "First, unlike horizontal mergers, vertical or
conglomerate mergers do not entail the loss of direct competition between the merging
firms in the same relevant market. As a result, the main source of anti-competitive effect
in horizontal mergers is absent from vertical and conglomerate mergers."; paragraph 13:
"Second, vertical and conglomerate mergers provide substantial scope for efficiencies.";
and paragraph 14: "Integration may also decrease transaction costs and allow for a better
co-ordination in terms of product design, the organisation of the production process, and
the way in which the products are sold." Id. at 7 1 11-14.
66. ALIsoN JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 49 (4th ed. 2008).
67. In part, the function of the state legal system in enforcing contracts is emphasized,
yet without questioning the existence of the legal system itself. On this point, see RONALD H.
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1. Constitutional Uncertainty and the International Exchange
Dilemma
At first, it is essential to examine the market-constitutive function
of a private law regime. In a primitive exchange situation, in which
payment matches delivery and the parties are physically present,
additional protective measures seem unnecessary. However, for modern
society, which is based on the division of labor, complex transactions
that generate goods and services at different locations simultaneously
are indispensable. According to game-theoretical parlance, in this case,
a so-called prisoner's dilemma arises between entirely isolated
transaction partners, 68 in which uncooperative behavior is, at least for
one of the parties, the economically optimal course of action. If no
sanctions for a breach of contract exist, both parties have an incentive to
act at the expense of the other party. For instance, if a vendor makes an
advance delivery of an ordered good, there is no economic incentive for
the buyer to come up with the contractually agreed payment in return.
If the buyer pays first, there is no incentive for the vendor to deliver the
good. As both parties anticipate a breach of contract, no party is willing
to perform in advance.69
Thus, the exchange of goods and services only takes place if an
economic subject can expect with sufficient certainty that an attractive
equivalent is acquired for the delivery of a good. Institutions that
guarantee legal decisions and enforcement of contracts safeguard this
expectation. In order to generate stable expectations between
anonymous transaction parties, nation-states established systems of
domestic private law that enforced the performance of a contract and
the respective claims for damages, even by legitimate force if
necessary. 70 Thereby the prisoner's dilemma is resolved, as the potential
costs of a damage award in the case of a breach of contract would exceed
the costs for the actual performance of the contract.
However, in the absence of a "world state," there is no supranational
world private law regime that would generate-as a functional
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAw 10 (1988), as well as DIXIT, supra note 4, at 3
('Thus conventional economic theory does not underestimate the importance of law; rather,
the problem is that it takes the existence of a well-functioning institution of state law for
granted").
68. A game-theoretical argument for this "international exchange dilemma" can, along
with other arguments, be found in Schmidt-Trenz & Schmidtchen, supra note 36, at 331.
69. See DIXIT, supra note 4, at 14; Paul H. Rubin, Legal Systems as Frameworks for
Market Exchanges, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 52, at 205,
213.
70. For a description of the state as an independent agent of contract enforcement, see
NORTH, supra note 3, at 58-60.
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equivalent of national private law systems-a level of contractual
certainty for cross-border trade comparable to the one provided for
transactions within developed nation-states. The judicial settling of
conflicts concerning transborder transactions thus always poses three
questions: (1) Which nation-states' courts are responsible for resolving
the conflict? (2) What national contract laws are the courts supposed to
apply in resolving the conflict? (3) Is a judgment from one state
recognized and enforceable in another nation-state?71
In theory, these issues are addressed by private international law
(PIL). However, contrary to its name, PIL does not represent uniform
international law. Rather, every state determines its own conflicts of
law provisions. Although the idea for a global private law based on
contracts under international law emerged at the end of the nineteenth
century, 72 more than a century of work in different international
organizations such as the Hague Conference on Private International
Law (since 1893), the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (UNIDROIT, since 1926), and the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (since 1966), have only
produced piecemeal results, like the U.N. Convention on the
International Sale of Goods of 1980.73 Hence, the transacting parties are
confronted with a plethora of different conflicts of law rules and
substantive norms. They cannot rely on the enforcement by state courts
because, in contrast to international arbitration, there is still no global
agreement about the recognition and enforcement of national
judgments. 74 Whether a foreign law is applied or whether a foreign
judgment is actually enforced domestically also depends on how
national courts assess the impact on their national ordre public. At least
in Europe, these issues have partly been mitigated due to intensive
integration efforts.75 However, in cross-border transactions with trade
71. Calliess, supra note 6, at 472.
72. See, e.g., Ernst Zitelmann, Die MOglichkeit eines Weltrechts [The Possibility of a
World Law] (1916).
73. For background on the U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG),
see generally FRANCO FERRARI, FONDATION POUR L'tUDE DU DROIT ET DES USAGES DU
COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL, QUO VADIS CISG? : CELEBRATING THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
(2005).
74. For background on the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters of 2005, which has still not taken effect, see generally
SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION (2003).
75. Especially through Council Regulation 593/2008, On the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations (Rome 1), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EC); Council Regulation 805/2004,
European Enforcement Order for Uncontested Claims, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 15 (EC); Council
Regulation 1206/2001, On Cooperation Between the Courts of the Member States in the
862
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
partners outside of Europe, the "constitutional uncertainty"76 often
causes such costs that the unassisted market becomes unavailable as a
form of organizing cross-border transactions."
2. The Reactions of Market Participants: Vertical Integration
International trade therefore relies on numerous private ordering
activities that safeguard such transactions institutionally. Relational
contracts, trade intermediaries and clubs, letters of credit, arbitration
tribunals, and many other related institutions compensate for the
constitutional uncertainty that state law leaves in international
markets. In this context, it is of central importance that transnational
corporations increasingly take measures to safeguard transactions
institutionally by their own internal structures (internalization of
market processes).7 8 As it is inherent in all private ordering activities
that transactions become integrated into bilateral or trilateral
dependency structures or structures of hierarchy, in the case of
transborder transactions, their organizational form shifts toward
vertical integration ceteris paribus (i.e., if the frequency, uncertainty,
and specificity of transactions remain unchanged). Graphically, this
relation can be illustrated as follows:
Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2001 (L 174) 1 (EC); Council
Regulation 44/2001, On Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC); Eur. Free Trade Ass'n,
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 620; EC Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations (Rome 1980), June 19, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1492.
76. Schmidt-Trenz & Schmidtchen, supra note 36, at 331.
77. See Dieter Schmidtchen & Hans Jorg Schmidt-Trenz, Private Law, The World
Production Possibility Frontier and the Need for an International "Private Law Community":
German Theory of Order and Constitutional Economics at Work 34 (Univ. of Saarland Ctr.
for the Study of New Institutional Econ., Working Paper) ("[Tirades between 'faceless buyers
and sellers' . . . hardly work in international trade. They require a developed legal system
and protective safeguard which we encounter only in an ideal domestic economy.").
78. See also Calliess, supra note 38, at 224.
863
864 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:2
Figure 2: The Level of Vertical Integration in Relation to the Specificity of a
Transaction, Taking into Account the Availability of State Mechanisms of
Private Law for the Protection of Transactions7 9
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Again it is important to acknowledge that international business
scholarship stresses other factors than those singled out by transaction
cost analysis in explaining multinational firms. Recently, knowledge-
based theories have prevailed.80 However, our thesis of an
overintegration in the global market triggered by deficiencies in the
institutional support framework still holds, all other possible factors
influencing the make-or-buy decision in a cross-border context being
equal. The remaining difficulty is in knowing how severe the problem is,
a fact for which the unavailability of comparative data on the extent of
vertical integration in domestic situations vis-A-vis cross-border
situations is difficult to assess.8 1
79. Source: authors' own design.
80. See supra note 26.
81. In other words, Figure 2 above consists of ordinal, rather than interval, scales, a
fact that is also true for the schema given in Williamson, supra note 13, at 12 fig.1.
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3. Support by Research on the National Level
However, recent analytical models and empirical tests have been
presented in the economic literature and address a similar topic: the
influence of national institutions surrounding the decision of whether to
organize cross-border economic transactions outside or within the firm.
Grossman and Helpman present a model concerning the case of a
firm in a specialized industry willing to transfer a part of its production
chain abroad. They link the decision of whether to outsource the activity
or choose foreign direct investment to the contracting environment in
the country of destination. They formulate a negative relationship: if the
contracting environment is good, a larger part of activities will be
transferred abroad by outsourcing, while foreign direct investment will
prevail if contracting is poorly protected.82
Drawing on a similar but more complex model, and also taking into
account the choice of where to outsource or do foreign direct investment,
AntrAs comes to a similar conclusion:
[I]n choosing between domestic and foreign sourcing, the
Northern manager H faces a trade-off between the lower
costs of Southern components and the higher incomplete-
contracting distortions associated with it . . . . Because
transactions in the North are governed by complete
contracts, ownership structure in Northern sourcing is
both indeterminate and irrelevant. In contrast, when
Southern sourcing is chosen . . . , the assignment of
residual rights is much more interesting . . . .83
Inspired by such theoretical regression analysis, economists have
conducted empirical research on the matter, testing the validity of the
models by statistics on cross-border trade.
For example, Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott have conducted
research on the relation between the contracting environment and the
boundaries of the firm by looking at the factors determining the share of
intrafirm trade in the total of U.S. imports. They conclude that affiliates
are more likely to be situated in countries with a good contracting
82. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Outsourcing Versus FDI in Industry
Equilibrium, 1 J. EUR. EcoN. AsS'N 317, 326 (2003).
83. Pol AntrAs, Property Rights and the International Organization of Production, 95 AM.
EcoN. REV. 25, 30-31 (2005).
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environment, whereas the share of intrafirm trade is lower in countries
with a poor institutional framework.84
The relationship between the quality of the contracting
environment and the sourcing decision is also supported by a study from
Matsuura and Ito. Having tested this issue on the Japanese cross-
border trade statistics, they find that the share of imports in the form of
intrafirm trade is negatively related to the quality of institutions in the
country of origin.85
Supported by such contributions in the economic literature, the
relation between the contracting environment and sourcing decisions
has become more and more visible in the public discussion. Thus, the
World Trade Organization also states in its annual report:
Another important factor in determining whether to
integrate or outsource and where to offshore is the
quality of the institutional framework . . . . The quality
of institutions matters because the contract between the
final good producer and the supplier of the intermediate
good in the arm's-length relationship needs to be
enforceable. If not, the risk of outsourcing may be too
high. 86
Leaving aside details, there is a clear finding, supported by the
contributions cited above, that legal institutions supporting contractual
obligations are a crucial factor for the sourcing decision of firms. If the
contracting environment is good, transactions will be managed on the
market via outsourcing. If contracting is poorly protected, intrafirm
trade is the preferred mode of organization.
The cited research projects may be concerned only with the relation
between the quality of national institutions and the decision between
intrafirm trade and outsourcing. However, there is a strong parallel to
the central problem of this article. It is plausible to conclude from the
findings on the national level that the relationship between the quality
84. Andrew B. Bernard et al., Intrafirm Trade and Product Contractibility, 100 AM.
EcoN. REV. 444, 448 (2010).
85. Toshiyuki Matsuura & Banri Ito, Intra-Firm Trade and Contract Completeness:
Evidence from Japanese Affiliate Firms 17 (RES. INST. OF EcON., TRADE & INDUSTRY
DIScusSION PAPERS No. 09-E-026 June 2009), available at http://www.rieti.go.jpljp/
publications/dp/09e026.pdf.
86. WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2008: TRADE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD
108 (2008) (citation omitted), available at http://www.wto.orglenglish/res-e/publications el
wtr08_e.htm.
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of institutions and the sourcing decision is the same on the
international level.
Empirical research on the quality of institutions supporting cross-
border transactions is urgently needed. However, it would be surprising
if the following thesis did not hold true: Weak protection of cross-border
contracting leads to a large share of intrafirm trade on international
markets. Respectively, better institutions on the international level
would foster the organization of cross-border transactions through
market mechanisms-namely, through outsourcing.
B. The Disenchantment of Vertical Integration
How does this finding affect the assessment of vertical integration?
One has to concede to the proponents of the more economic approach in
European competition policy that vertical integration in cross-border
transactions is indeed microeconomically efficient for the trade partners
involved. This approach enables transborder economic exchange that,
due to the high uncertainty of market governance, would otherwise not
be conducted at all. However, it remains questionable whether the
assumption can be maintained so that the so-called consumer pass-on
can achieve a positive effect for national economies.87
From a macroeconomic perspective on transaction costs, the
increased level of vertical integration in cross-border markets is
alarming. Due to the euphoria about the potential efficiency advantages,
problems arising from integrated organizational structures are
underestimated. 88 Hybrid governance mechanisms such as letters of
credit or arbitration entail significant additional transaction costs.
Trade clubs and trade intermediaries take commissions. Even to the
extent that international trade is safeguarded by a transaction-specific
m6lange of public and private governance mechanisms,89 significant
transaction costs arise in the negotiation phase through the
involvement of international law firms.9 0 The organizational costs and
friction losses of hierarchical steering of the transnational corporations
discussed here are especially significant as the size of these structures is
immense. By dint of the principal-agent relations within the corporate
structure, friction losses emerge through the so-called X-Inefficiency. 91
87. See supra Part IV.C.
88. Williamson, supra note 13, at 11 ("mhe move from market to hierarchy is always
attended by a loss of incentive intensity and added bureaucratic costs").
89. See Calliess, supra note 11.
90. See Sosa, supra note 11.
91. For more details on X-Inefficiency, see Harvey Leibenstein, X-Efficiency, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DIcHoNARY OF EcONOMICS, supra note 16.
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The latter denotes the difference between the actual costs incurred and
the minimally necessary costs, especially due to a lack in competition
incentives and the pursuit of interests stemming from outside a
company's core business. For instance, individual employees avoid
sensible decisions for the corporation as a whole if those decisions
jeopardize their own career or future employment. In order to
strengthen their own position, synergy effects remain unutilized or low-
prized external sources of supply are concealed.92 Also, heterarchical
corporate networks, which are characterized by long-term contractual
relations, suffer from low competition incentives and require
bureaucratic efforts to maintain relations. Furthermore, the costs of
network structures increase disproportionately with increasing size;
with the conduct of transactions spanning very long distances, with
members coming from very different cultures, it is far more difficult and
costly to establish an effective reputational network. 93
Due to these disadvantages, Williamson termed the firm-internal
conduct of transactions as the organization form of last resort. He gives
clear guidance: "try markets, try hybrids, and have recourse to the firm
only when all else fails."94 Vertical integration is only then economically
beneficial and advised if the specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of
transactions justify the high level of time and effort expended.
Otherwise market governance is the more attractive organizational
form, as it allows a leaner internal administration and offers optimal
structures of incentives through competition.
The increased level of vertical integration adds bureaucratic costs
through cross-border transactions. Vertical integration does enable
global economic exchange-but only at high costs. Via the final price for
any good or service provided across borders, the consumer pays the
profit margin of private providers of hybrid governance mechanisms or
transnational corporations, respectively. In order to avoid any
misunderstanding, it should again be stressed that vertical integration
is not unwanted per se; rather, it offers a sensible and cost-effective
organizational form when the specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of
transactions are high. However, the tailor-made governance solutions of
transnational commerce lack the economies of scale that a state-
organized private law regime offers as a safeguard for the multitude of
92. See Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INsTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS, supra note 52, at 319, 336.
93. However, this form of organization is made less expensive by technological
developments, especially the Internet and online communication, which provide private
order with a competitive edge vis-A-vis state order. See Dietz & Nieswandt, supra note 11.
94. Williamson, supra note 13, at 12.
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relatively unspecific transactions.9 5 The additional costs for increased
integration ultimately must be carried by the consumer. Even if one
could suspend sociopolitical concerns about power-laden economic
structures, the assumption that economically efficient vertical
integration always has a positive effect for the consumer in the long-
term could not provide a convincing argument for cross-border
constellations. Thus, it is not enough to portray vertical integration as a
means for maximizing consumer welfare per se.
VI. CONSEQUENCES FOR COMPETITION POLICY
In this final section, we draw consequences from our reasoning for
the future orientation of competition policy.
A. Antitrust Law: A Remedy?
If forms of vertical integration in cross-border transactions cause
concern for competition policy, can they not be prevented through the
restrictive regulation of vertical agreements and mergers under
antitrust law? However, this notion itself suggests that antitrust law
would not go far enough due to a number of reasons.
First, it would be counterproductive. If the integration of
transactions into dependency structures and corporate structures were
the only possible way to generate sufficient certainty for transactions in
the absence of a functioning state private law system, the ban of such
structures under antitrust law would render the conduct of cross-border
transactions nearly impossible. Under antitrust law, what has
developed-in given circumstances-into an indispensable component of
the cross-border division of labor should not be banned due to state
omissions in the field of the supranational private law.
Furthermore, in practice, it could not be answered with certainty
whether and to what degree the legal uncertainty of international
markets is a decisive factor for the vertical integration of a concrete
transaction. The decision about the most reasonable organizational form
at the time of a transaction is based on a number of economic
considerations; here, the institutional function of the firm as organizer
of internal markets is only one factor among others. The theoretical
explanatory approach of the effects of deficient state protection of
private law in cross-border transactions on the structure of transborder
markets is therefore not an instrument that competition authorities
could apply in their practice.
95. THOMAs DiEZr, INSTITUTIONEN UND GLOBALISIERUNG 44-51 (2010).
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B. Competition Policy Through Private Law
Does the fact that antitrust law is not able to offer a solution for this
problem lead to the conclusion that state competition policy is powerless
altogether? This is certainly not the case if one moves away from the
widely held equation of competition policy and competition law. An
economic constitution geared toward the free market is based on several
pillars: transaction law, intervention law, and regulatory law.96
Whereas transaction law safeguards property rights and contract
enforcement, intervention law is concerned with the provision of public
goods, for whose production the market offers no sufficient incentive.
Finally, regulatory law defines the limits of state intervention into the
freedom of economic subjects and guards against competition
restrictions through private actors. As a component of corrective
regulatory law, competition law has only a subordinate function in this
structure because at the very least it requires that hypothetically
competitive market structures be defended against competition
restrictions. Transaction law, however, is constitutive for the formation
of competitive markets. Only if the protection of property rights and the
enforcement of contracts are guaranteed by transaction law will
economic subjects be able to start exchanges with anonymous trade
partners. Only a private law regime-which institutionalizes the course
of justice and is capable of enforcing justified claims with legitimate
force-allows market participants to conduct transactions beyond
structures of personal dependency and hierarchy. Therefore, a
functioning transaction law logically precedes competition law as part of
regulatory law.
The institution of transaction law also takes precedence when
applied to the area of cross-border transactions, so that considerations
in competition law find a foundation in the first place. In other words,
antitrust law cannot regulate the market structure as long as a market
cannot emerge in the absence of transaction law. Only by dint of
sufficient institutional protection can both market transactions between
independent parties be made possible across borders and the level of
vertical integration be lowered to a degree tenable from the perspective
96. See Peter Behrens, Die Bedeutung des Kollisionsrechts ffir die "Globalisierung" der
Wirtschaft [The Significance of Conflict of Laws to the "Globalization"of the Economy], in
AUFBRUCH NACH EuROPA: 75 JAHRE MAX-PLANCK-INSTfUT FUR PRIVATRECHT 384-86
(Jilrgen Basedow et al. eds., 2001) (Ger.); Wolfgang Kerber & Viktor Vanberg, Constitutional
Aspects of Party Autonomy and Its Limits - The Perspective of Constitutional Economics, in
PARTY AuTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET 49 (Stefan
Grundmann et al. eds., 2001); Peter Behrens, Weltwirtschaftsverfassung [World Economic
System], 19 JAHRBUCH FUR NEUE POLITISCHE OKONOMIE 5, 9 (2000) (Ger.).
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of transaction cost theory. The analysis of cross-border market
structures from the viewpoint of transaction cost theory proves that, due
to the high degree of vertical integration, the entire global economy
incurs higher costs than necessary. In the nineteenth century, nation-
states already recognized the cost benefits of the free market, although
on a smaller scale. Nationalizing commercial law and free trade
between independent parties beyond locally limited network structures
enabled this.97 Today, the advantages of a low level of vertical
integration in the economy is recognized and utilized as well. In order to
save on administrative costs and to gain flexibility, corporations tend to
decouple activities outside of their core competence from their hierarchy
and transfer them to other companies through so-called outsourcing.
However, economic analyses demonstrate that corporations tend to
outsource only in those countries in which legal institutions provide
sufficient enforcement of contracts with independent contractual
partners.98
This highlights the need for state institutions that safeguard legal
decision making and enforcement of contracts when it comes to cross-
border transactions at arms' length. However, it remains beyond the
scope of this article to inquire how this aim can be achieved: whether
through the institution of a unitary world private law, the unification of
international private law and civil procedures, or the improved
cooperation of national judiciaries or similar reforms. 99 It is important
that, first of all, the need to act is recognized. As the reluctant
unification of private law at the international and the European level
shows, this need to act is currently misconceived in both disciplines.100
In order to take up the challenge of an increasingly networked world
economy, the debate about vertical integration in competition policy
should get rid of its blinders caused by antitrust law and engage in a
symbiosis with (international) private law policy as part of competition
97. A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL
MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL EcONOMY 142 (2003).
98. See generally Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Outsourcing in a Global
Economy, 72 REV. EcON. STUD. 135, 137-42 (2005); Nathan Nunn, Relationship-Specificity,
Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade, 122 Q.J. ECON. 569, 594-97 (2007).
99. A plethora of suggestions for improving the state protection of private law can be
found in Gralf-Peter Calliess & Hermann Hoffmann, Effektive Justizdienstleistungen fir den
globalen Handel, 42 ZErTScHRIFI FUR RECHTSPOLITIK 1 (2009) (Ger.). For a general
discussion, see Gralf-Peter Calliess & Hermann B. Hoffmann, Judicial Services for Global
Commerce -Made in Germany?, 10 GER. L.J. 115 (2009).
100. For a survey of the discussion about and the activities devoted to the unification of
European private law, see Jan M. Smits, Convergence of Private Law in Europe: Towards a
New Jus Commune?, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 219 (Esin Oriicu & David Nelken
eds., 2007).
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policy in a broad sense. The slogan should hence be: competition policy
by dint of private law!
SUMMARY
The continuing growth of transnational corporations challenges
global competition policy. To a hitherto unknown extent, such
corporations are deemed too big to fail. A decisive factor in the
formation of transnational corporations is the fact that, as a functional
equivalent of market governance, they are able to solve external
problems arising in market transactions through internal means (i.e.,
firms as the organizers of internal transactions).
Popularized by the more economic approach, the opinion that
vertical integration not only creates benefits at the business level but
also for the overall economy, and therefore vertical integration remains
harmless, cannot be accepted without qualification. Against the
backdrop of the particularities of cross-border transactions regarding
their constitutional uncertainty, the idea of vertical integration's
harmlessness cannot be unconditionally applied to the assessment of
transnational corporations. In the absence of sufficient protection by a
private law regime, cross-border transactions suffer from the so-called
international exchange dilemma, for which the involved parties try to
compensate by the increased vertical integration of their transactions.
The level of vertical integration in cross-border transactions is therefore
higher and, from the perspective of transaction cost theory, less
justifiable than in the case of comparable domestic transactions. The
transaction costs generated and ultimately borne by the consumers
contradict the assumption that vertical integration benefits the
consumer in the long run.
Under the current circumstances, vertical integration is a necessary
means to generate sufficiently stable expectations for the conduct of
cross-border transactions, and the ban of vertical integration under
antitrust law would be counterproductive. The role of private law as
transaction law, which constitutes competition, is misconceived in the
debate about competition policy. Hence, the interdisciplinary discourse
between competition policy and private law policy must be intensified in
order to call attention to the need for the efficient protection of
transactions by private law for efficiently functioning international
market structures.
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